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A
principal goal of economic modeling is to improve the formulation of
economic policy. Macroeconomic models with imperfect competition
and sticky prices set in a dynamic optimizing framework have gained
wide popularity in recent years for examining issues involving monetary policy.
For example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999b) and McCallum and Nelson
(1999) examine the behavior of model economies under a variety of mone-
tary policy rules; Ireland (1995) examines the optimal way to disinﬂate; and
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (forthcoming) and Wolman (1998) study
the monetary policy implications of the zero bound on nominal interest rates.1
Nevertheless, serious questions remain as to whether these models accurately
describe the U.S. economy, and therefore as to how one should interpret the
results of this research.
One criticism of optimizing sticky-price models is that the relationship
between output and inﬂation they generate is inconsistent with the behavior of
these variables in the United States.2 However, recent research by Sbordone
(1998) and Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) has breathed new life into these models
by shifting attention away from the relationship between output and inﬂation
and toward one between marginal cost and inﬂation—the latter being a more
fundamental relationship in the models. If ﬁrms have some market power, as
under imperfect competition, the behavior of their marginal cost of production
is an important determinant of how they set prices. In turn, the overall price
The author thanks Mike Dotsey, Andreas Hornstein, Tom Humphrey, Bob King, Wenli Li,
and Pierre Sarte for helpful comments and discussions. This article does not necessarily
represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or any branch of the Federal
Reserve System.
1 These are but a few of the many papers using such models. For a survey, see Taylor (1999).
2 See Fuhrer and Moore (1995).
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level and inﬂation rate are determined by aggregating individual ﬁrms’ pricing
decisions. There is then a clear relationship between the behavior of individual
ﬁrms’ marginal cost and the behavior of inﬂation. Sbordone (1998) and Gal´ ı
and Gertler (1999) use this relationship to estimate and evaluate optimizing
sticky-price models.3 They ﬁnd that such models can accurately replicate the
observed behavior of inﬂation.
In this article, we work through the details of a sticky-price model, making
explicit the relationship between marginal cost and inﬂation just described. We
then offer a criticism of the speciﬁc form of price stickiness used by Sbordone
and Gal´ ı and Gertler; essentially, they let prices be implausibly sticky. Plausible
forms of price stickiness generate fundamentally different inﬂation dynamics
and hence will be more difﬁcult to reconcile with the behavior of marginal
cost and inﬂation in the United States. However, the methodology introduced
by Sbordone (1998) and Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) remains a promising approach
for evaluating sticky-price models. We suggest two ways in which this research
agenda can continue progressing.
We concentrate on partial equilibrium analysis. The analysis takes as given
the average inﬂation rate and the behavior of demand and real marginal cost.
A complete general equilibrium version of our sticky-price framework would
include descriptions of factor markets, consumer behavior, and monetary policy.
In a general equilibrium, marginal cost and inﬂation would be endogenous; con-
ditional on private behavior, policy would determine the behavior of inﬂation.
Nonetheless, even in a general equilibrium, one would observe the relationship
between marginal cost and inﬂation that is the focus of this article.
1. FROM INDIVIDUAL FIRMS’ PRICING TO
AGGREGATE INFLATION
Two central components comprise most of the recent optimizing sticky-price
models: (1) monopolistic competition among a large number of ﬁrms produc-
ing differentiated products and (2) limited opportunities for price adjustment by
individual ﬁrms. Monopolistic competition makes it feasible for some ﬁrms not
to adjust their price in a given period; under perfect competition, only ﬁrms that
charged the lowest price would sell anything. Limited price adjustment means
that real and nominal variables interact; output and real marginal cost—both
real variables—affect individual ﬁrms’ pricing decisions, which in turn affect
the price level and inﬂation.
3 There is a separate literature dating back at least to the 1960s and continuing today that
relates the behavior of inﬂation to marginal cost in reduced-form econometric models. See, for
example, Eckstein and Wyss (1972).            
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Monopolistic Competition
The ﬁrst component is monopolistic competition. The monopolistic competition
framework most common in recent models is that of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
The large number of ﬁrms mentioned above is represented mathematically by
a continuum, and the ﬁrms are indexed by z ∈ (0,1). Assume that these ﬁrms’
differentiated products can be aggregated into a single good, interpreted as ﬁnal
output. If yt(z) is the amount produced by ﬁrm z, ﬁnal output is
yt =





With this aggregator function and market structure, demand for the good pro-







where Pt(z) is the nominal price of good z, and Pt and the price of one unit of
yt. According to (2), demand for good z has a constant elasticity of −ε with
respect to the relative price of good z, and given the relative price, demand is
proportional to the index of ﬁnal output (yt). The Appendix contains a detailed
derivation of the demand function (2) and shows that the price index (Pt)i s
Pt =






The price index has the property that an increase in the price of one of the
goods has a positive but not necessarily one-for-one effect on the index. If that
good’s nominal price is lower (higher) than the price index, an increase in its
price raises the price index more (less) than one-for-one, because the good has
a relatively high (low) expenditure share.
Limited Price Adjustment
Limited opportunities for price adjustment constitute the second important
component of our representative model. We assume that any ﬁrm z ∈ (0,1)
faces an exogenous probability of adjusting its price in period t and that the
probability may depend on when the ﬁrm last adjusted its price. The probability
of adjusting is non-decreasing in the number of periods since the last adjust-
ment, and we denote by J the maximum number of periods a ﬁrm’s price can
be ﬁxed.4 The key notation describing limited price adjustment will be a vector
α; the jth element of α, called αj, is the probability that a ﬁrm adjusts its price
˜˜ in period t, conditional on its previous adjustment having occurred in period
t − j.
4 Looking ahead, one of the speciﬁcations we will focus on has J = ∞.           
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From the vector α we derive the fractions of ﬁrms in period t charging
˜ prices set in periods t − j, which we denote by ωj. To do this, note that
ωj = (1 − αj)ωj−1, for j = 1,2,...,J − 1,
and (4)




This system of linear equations can be solved for ωj as a function of α. The
˜ most common pricing speciﬁcations in the literature are those ﬁrst described
by Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983). Taylor’s speciﬁcation is one of uniformly
staggered price setting: every ﬁrm sets its price for J periods, and at any point in
time a fraction 1/J of ﬁrms charge a price set j periods ago. The (J−1)-element
vector of adjustment probabilities for the Taylor model is α = [0,...,0], and the
˜ J-element vector of fractions of ﬁrms is ω = [1/J,1/J,...,1/J]. In contrast,
˜ Calvo’s speciﬁcation involves uncertainty about when ﬁrms can adjust their
price. No matter when a ﬁrm last adjusted its price, it faces a probability α of
adjusting. Thus, the inﬁnite vector of adjustment probabilities is α = [α,α,...],
˜ and the inﬁnite vector of fractions of ﬁrms is ωj = α(1 − α) j, j = 0,1,.... For
the speciﬁcation we will advocate in Section 3, contrary to Taylor and Calvo,
the adjustment fractions are strictly increasing in j and J is ﬁnite.
For any pattern of price adjustment, as deﬁned by the αj or ωj, the price
index (3) can be simpliﬁed to reﬂect the fact that all ﬁrms that set their price in
the same period will choose the same price.5 Let P0,t denote the price chosen












The next step is to show how P0,t is determined.
Optimal Pricing Decisions
In those periods when a ﬁrm is able to adjust its price, the price that it chooses
will be affected by the pattern of future adjustment opportunities it expects,
that is, by α. To determine the optimal price for an adjusting ﬁrm, we must
˜ ﬁrst state the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization problem. If πj,t denotes the nominal
proﬁts in period t of a ﬁrm that charges a price set in period t − j, then the
5 If there are ﬁrm-speciﬁc state variables other than price, then all adjusting ﬁrms will
generally not choose the same price. This would be the case, for example, if ﬁrms faced costs of
adjusting their labor input. Such a model would be more difﬁcult to analyze, as the number of
different types of ﬁrms one would need to track would grow without bound over time.               
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expected present discounted value of proﬁts that the ﬁrm is concerned with









where Et denotes expectation that is conditional on information available when
the period t pricing decision is made, and ∆j,t+j is the discount factor appro-
priate for discounting nominal proﬁts from period t + j back to period t.6 The
factor (ωj/ω0) is the probability that a ﬁrm that adjusts its price in period t will
still be charging that price in period t+j.7 Although the summation stops with
period t + J − 1, the ﬁrm of course cares about its proﬁts further in the future
than period t+J −1. However, its choice of a price in period t has no bearing
on proﬁts beyond period t+J−1, because by then a new price will be chosen.8









If the ﬁrm could adjust its price every period, then ωj would be zero for all j
greater than zero; the optimal price would make marginal proﬁts zero within
every period. Price stickiness means that marginal proﬁts are generally nonzero
within a period, but the discounted sum of marginal proﬁts is zero.
Proﬁts in a given period are the difference between revenue and costs. For
a ﬁrm in period t + j that charges a price it set in period t, we will denote the
demand it faces and its costs of production by yj,t+j and TCj,t+j, respectively.
Its proﬁts can then be expressed as
πj,t+j = P0,tyj,t+j − TCj,t+j. (8)






yt+j − TCj,t+j. (9)
Total revenue—the ﬁrst term in (9)—is simply the product of the price the
ﬁrm charges and the demand it faces. Total costs will generally depend on




(1 + Rt)−1(1 + Rt+1)−1 ···(1 + Rt+j−1)−1 
for j > 0, and ∆0,t = 1.
7 This factor can also be written
 j
k=0(1 − αk), where α0 ≡ 0.
8 We are implicitly assuming there are no other linkages between proﬁts in the current period
and the ﬁrms’ decisions in prior periods. This assumption may not be innocuous. For example, it
rules out dependence of the ﬁrm’s costs in period t on its production in a prior period.            
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factor prices, factor utilization, and the level of technology. For now we leave
unspeciﬁed the determinants of costs. Below we will describe assumptions
that imply marginal cost can be easily measured. Differentiating (9) yields an
expression for marginal proﬁts:
∂πj,t+j
∂P0,t









The ﬁrst term in (10) is marginal revenue with respect to price. Because there is
a constant elasticity of demand greater than unity, marginal revenue with respect
to price is always negative; lowering its price will always increase a ﬁrm’s rev-
enue. The second term is marginal cost with respect to price. It is convenient
to express the ﬁrm’s marginal cost with respect to quantity produced rather






to write (10) as
∂πj,t+j
∂P0,t



















.( 1 1 )
The object in brackets will be referred to as real marginal cost; it is the ﬁrm’s
marginal production cost denominated in the ﬁnal good. The other factors in
the second term represent the effect of a change in the price charged on the
quantity of goods demanded from the ﬁrm. Since real marginal cost plays a








Following up on the above discussion of total costs, real marginal cost will
generally depend on variables such as the real wage. Measuring marginal cost
directly is generally not a simple matter.
To derive an explicit expression for an adjusting ﬁrm’s optimal price, ﬁrst



















= 0. (13)           
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If the price level and marginal cost are constant, then (14) yields the constant






ψ. This is the markup (or relative price) that maximizes one-period
proﬁts. If the price level or marginal cost are not constant, then neither is the
relative price that maximizes one-period proﬁts. Therefore a ﬁrm whose nom-
inal price may be ﬁxed for more than one period chooses a nominal price that
it expects will sacriﬁce the fewest discounted proﬁts over the life of the price.
Inﬂation
If aggregate demand (yt), real marginal cost (ψt), and nominal interest rates
(equivalently the discount factors ∆j,t+j) are taken as given, then the pair of
equations (5) and (14) jointly describe the behavior of the aggregate price level
and the price chosen by individual ﬁrms. Thus, if we knew the processes gov-
erning aggregate demand, real marginal cost, and nominal interest rates, then
we could use (5) and (14) to determine the behavior of the price level and hence
inﬂation. In general it is tedious to obtain an explicit expression for inﬂation.
However, it is easy to compute the behavior of inﬂation. A simple pricing
speciﬁcation will sufﬁce to illustrate the method by which one can compute
the behavior of inﬂation. In analyzing this special case, we will linearize the
equations for the price index and for optimal pricing around a steady state with
constant inﬂation rate µ. Linear approximations are also used in the empirical
work by Sbordone (1998) and Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999).
The special case is a model where no ﬁrm sets its price for more than two
periods, so that α = [α1] and ω = [1/(2 − α1),(1 − α1)/(2 − α1)]. In this





















ytψ0,t + (1 − α1)Et[∆1,t+1(Pt/Pt+1)−1−εyt+1ψ1,t+1]
yt + (1 − α1)Et[∆1,t+1(Pt/Pt+1)−εyt+1]
.
By linearizing these equations around a steady state with gross inﬂation equal
to µ, we will get a system of expectational difference equations. Before lin-
earizing, rewrite the equations in terms of detrended nominal variables:          



























ytψ0,t + (1 − α1)Et[∆1,t+1µ1+ε(˜ Pt/˜ Pt+1)−1−εyt+1ψ1,t+1]
yt + (1 − α1)Et[∆1,t+1µε(˜ Pt/˜ Pt+1)−εyt+1]
. (16)
In (15), (16), and henceforth, the variables ˜ P0,t and ˜ Pt should be interpreted
as deviations from a trend that is growing at rate µ; that is, ˜ P0,t = P0,t/µt and
˜ Pt = Pt/µt.















· µε−1ˆ P0,t−1. (17)
Here (P0/P) denotes the ratio of the price set by an adjusting ﬁrm to the
aggregate price level in a steady state where the price level is growing at rate
µ, and ˆ Pt and ˆ P0,t are logarithmic deviations from the steady-state values of ˜ Pt
and ˜ P0,t, respectively. The steady-state ratio (P0/P) can easily be determined





. According to (17), if inﬂation
is high enough or the probability of adjustment is low enough, then a given
change in prices set in the previous period has a larger effect on this period’s
price index than does the same change in prices set this period. The reason is
that, with inﬂation eroding relative prices, the relative prices of goods set in
the previous period is low, and hence the quantity of those goods purchased
is high. Furthermore, with relatively elastic demand, the share of expenditure
on the low-priced goods will be higher than the share of expenditure on the
high-priced goods, meaning that goods with a price set in the previous period
carry greater weight in the steady-state price index.9












ψ0 + (1 − α1)∆1µ1+εψ1
1 + (1 − α1)∆1µε
 
,
9 If there is a high adjustment probability, then this expenditure share is low, and the opposite
result holds.        















ψ0 + (1 − α1)∆1µ1+εψ1
1 + (1 − α1)∆1µε
  
(1 − α1)∆1µε




























1 + (1 − α1)∆1µε
 
{ψ0ˆ yt + (1 − α1)∆1µ1+εψ1
· Et( ˆ ∆1,t+1 + ˆ yt+1) −
 
ψ0 + (1 − α1)∆1µ1+εψ1
1 + (1 − α1)∆1µε
 
[ˆ yt + (1 − α1)∆1µε
· Et( ˆ ∆1,t+1 + ˆ yt+1)]}.
If α1 is low enough and µ is high enough, then (a2 − a3) will be positive, in
which case (18) says that the price set by an adjusting ﬁrm is increasing in
the price level and increasing in next period’s expected inﬂation. A ﬁrm raises
its price as the price level rises because it has an optimal level for its relative
price (note that [16] can be written with P0,t/Pt on the left-hand side). Expected
inﬂation next period raises a ﬁrm’s desired price because it means that any price
set in the current period will erode in relative terms; ﬁrms compensate for the
erosion by setting a higher price when they can adjust. The coefﬁcients b0 and
b1 are positive, which means that the price chosen by adjusting ﬁrms responds
positively to marginal cost in the current period and to expected future marginal
cost. Finally, the variable xt represents the effects on a ﬁrm’s optimal price of
current and future aggregate demand and the nominal discount factor. We have
lumped these factors into the variable xt in order to focus attention on the fact
that (17) and (18) jointly determine the behavior of the price level and adjusting
ﬁrms’ optimal prices, conditional on the behavior of real marginal cost and the
variables in xt.
Pursuing now the joint determination of ˆ P0,t and ˆ Pt, we write (17) and (18)
as a system of linear expectational difference equations in the variables ˆ Pt and
ˆ P0,t−1 :             




























xt + b0 ˆ ψ0,t + b1Et ˆ ψ1,t+1
 
. (19)
The methods described by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) allow one to solve
for the behavior of ˆ Pt given a known process for ˆ xt and ˆ ψi,t.10 For general
speciﬁcations of price stickiness—that is, α—the system corresponding to (19)
˜ is more complicated. There are additional expected future values of inﬂation,
demand, marginal cost, and discount factors in the analogue to (18), and there
are additional past values of optimal prices in the analogue to (17). However,
the method for deriving and then solving the system of difference equations
is almost identical. For any speciﬁcation of α then, the solution to the analogue
˜ to (19) describes how the behavior of real marginal cost and xt translates into
the behavior of inﬂation. This relationship is the basis for the empirical work
to be discussed next.
2. TAKING THE MODEL TO DATA
Our microeconomic-based sticky-price model determines the behavior of the
aggregate price level, and hence the inﬂation rate, in partial equilibrium.11
From an empirical perspective, this relationship is important because it en-
ables researchers to work with aggregate variables like inﬂation rather than
individual variables like the prices of particular goods. Sbordone (1998) and
Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) apply this result in a new and interesting way: they
estimate the parameters α, and then test whether the estimated model success-
˜ fully accounts for actual inﬂation.
Suppose that all of the models’ parameters were known and that data on real
marginal cost for different types of ﬁrms (ψj,t), aggregate output, and nominal
interest rates (the components of xt), were all available. Then we could use
(19) to simulate the behavior of inﬂation. To simulate, solve the model so that
the price level is expressed as a function of the exogenous variables (xt and
10 Note that an initial condition for P0,t−1 is also needed; we will assume the steady-state
initial condition. The impulse response functions to be presented below are produced using algo-
rithms developed by King and Watson (1998); these algorithms make it easy to solve the more
complicated systems that result from more complicated forms of price stickiness.
11 Recall from above that in a general equilibrium model there would also be a description
of monetary policy. While monetary policy would determine the behavior of inﬂation, inﬂation
behavior would still have to be consistent with individual ﬁrms’ pricing. And ﬁrms would still
take the behavior of inﬂation as given.          
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ˆ ψj,t). Then use the observed sequences of exogenous variables to build up a
simulated price-level series, from which it is easy to create a simulated inﬂation
series. Of course the parameters are not known, but they can be estimated so
that the simulated behavior of inﬂation is closest to what we observe. Roughly
speaking, this is what Sbordone and Gal´ ı and Gertler do.12
Gal´ ı and Gertler make two key assumptions. The ﬁrst assumption is that
price stickiness is given by the Calvo speciﬁcation, so that only one parameter
is related to price stickiness (recall that the Calvo speciﬁcation is αj = α for
j = 1,2,...∞). The second assumption is that all ﬁrms produce using identical
Cobb-Douglas technologies and the labor market is competitive over the whole
economy.13 We will take up the pricing speciﬁcation later. Here we explain the
importance of the second assumption.
In order for the empirical approach described above to be feasible, the
researcher must have access to data on marginal cost. But unlike GDP or in-
ﬂation, marginal cost is not a data series measured by a government statistical
agency. Measurement is lacking for a good reason: the appropriate measure of
marginal cost depends on characteristics of the economy which are only imper-
fectly understood. These characteristics include the competitiveness of factor
markets and the extent of adjustment costs ﬁrms face in hiring new workers
and installing new capital.14 The assumptions described above surmount this
problem, as they imply that the appropriate measure of real marginal cost is
labor’s share of output—unit labor costs. Estimates of these series are widely
available, and hence estimation of α is feasible.
To see how labor’s share can reﬂect real marginal cost, let Yt be output,

















. In a competitive labor market, ∂TC/∂L is
simply the nominal wage (Wt), and ∂Y/∂L is of course the marginal prod-
uct of labor—(1 − α)At (Kt/Lt)α for the Cobb-Douglas case. Therefore, real
marginal cost is ψt = (Wt/Pt) ÷
 
(1 − α)At (Kt/Lt)α 
.I fw el e twt denote
the real wage (wt = Wt/Pt), then real marginal cost can be expressed as
ψt = wtLt ÷ [(1 − α)Yt]. Real marginal cost, then, is proportional to labor’s
share of output, and variations in labor’s share provide a measure of variations
in real marginal cost.
12 These authors each use different estimation methods. However, it is fair to summarize
both of those methods as ones that choose the model’s parameters in order to best ﬁt observed
inﬂation.
13 These authors also linearize around a zero inﬂation steady state, which simpliﬁes things
further. Sbordone allows marginal cost to vary according to when ﬁrms last adjusted their price,
whereas Gal´ ı and Gertler do not. As such, Sbordone’s analysis is more general than what we
describe.
14 Similar problems are involved in the measurement of output. Arguably, however, the
problems are more severe for marginal cost.          
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Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) ﬁnd that, with labor’s share as a proxy for real
marginal cost, a Calvo pricing model explains post–1960 U.S. inﬂation quite
well. Their estimate of α is roughly 0.2, implying that ﬁrms keep their prices
ﬁxed for about ﬁve quarters on average. This result is striking. It runs counter
to the claims of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and others that forward-looking
sticky-price models are inconsistent with the behavior of U.S. inﬂation. Gal´ ı
and Gertler reconcile these results by emphasizing that previous work explained
inﬂation through the behavior of output. As is clear from (19), however, the key
variable for explaining inﬂation is real marginal cost rather than output.15 Thus
Gal´ ı and Gertler argue that the main empirical difﬁculty is not in explaining
inﬂation behavior with a forward-looking sticky-price model, but in reconciling
the behavior of output with the behavior of real marginal cost.
3. INFLATION DYNAMICS ARE SENSITIVE TO
THE PRICING STRUCTURE
One might think that because the Calvo model ﬁts inﬂation data well, it must
be an appropriate model. However, another aspect of the data is fundamentally
at odds with the Calvo model. Unfortunately, it appears difﬁcult to eliminate
this discrepancy without changing the implications for inﬂation dynamics.
Recall that the Calvo speciﬁcation posits a common price-adjustment prob-
ability (α) for all ﬁrms. From (4), we see that the distribution of fractions of
ﬁrms is then given by ωj = α(1 − α) j, for j = 1,2,.... That is, a positive
fraction of ﬁrms charges a price set arbitrarily many periods in the past. This is
clearly a counterfactual implication. However, the Calvo speciﬁcation allows
for a characterization of inﬂation dynamics even simpler than (16), and it may
be worth paying the price of an inﬁnite distribution in order to gain this sim-
pliﬁcation. Supporting this view is the fact that the fractions of ﬁrms become
arbitrarily small as the number of periods increases; for example, if α = 0.2,
less than 0.02 percent of ﬁrms charge a price set more than ten years in the past.
With numbers that small, it is difﬁcult to believe that the Calvo speciﬁcation
could produce dynamics qualitatively different than those associated with a
more plausible speciﬁcation generating the same average duration of a ﬁxed
price. Recent work by Kiley (1998), however, suggests that two such models
would produce qualitatively different dynamics. To investigate the implications
for inﬂation of different speciﬁcations of price stickiness, we ﬁrst estimate a
univariate autoregression for labor’s share (used here to represent real marginal
cost). We then compare the sticky-price model’s impulse response functions of
inﬂation to a shock to labor’s share for the different speciﬁcations.
15 When average inﬂation (µ − 1) is nearly zero, the coefﬁcients on demand and nominal
interest rates in (19) will be small.      
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Figure 1 Three Pricing Speciﬁcations
The three pricing speciﬁcations we analyze are illustrated in Figure 1.
Panel a shows the patterns of adjustment probabilities (αs), and panel b shows
˜ the distributions of fractions of ﬁrms (ωs). The solid lines represent a Calvo
˜ speciﬁcation close to that estimated by Gal´ ı and Gertler.16 The dashed lines are
16 Gal´ ı and Gertler’s speciﬁcation is slightly different, as they allow for a fraction of ﬁrms to
be “rule-of-thumb” price setters. However, these ﬁrms turn out to be unimportant for their results.    
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arguably a more reasonable speciﬁcation: no ﬁrms charge a price set more than
eight quarters ago, but the average duration of a ﬁxed price is ﬁve quarters,
just as for the solid-line Calvo speciﬁcation. The dashed line, which we will
refer to as our preferred case, has further appeal in that it is the kind of price-
adjustment pattern generated if ﬁrms face a distribution of ﬁxed costs of price
adjustment, as in Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999). Finally, the dotted line
is an intermediate case: as in the Calvo case, ﬁrms face a constant adjustment
probability for the ﬁrst 12 quarters that they are charging a price, but the
adjustment probabilities jump to one after the twelfth quarter.
Figure 2 shows the response of inﬂation to a marginal cost shock (as prox-
ied for by labor’s share) under these three speciﬁcations of price stickiness. In
studying these pictures, it is important to keep in mind that the Calvo speciﬁca-
tion (solid line) has been shown to be consistent with the behavior of inﬂation
in the United States when labor’s share is used to represent marginal cost.
For that case, the response of inﬂation to a marginal cost shock is relatively
small, but fairly persistent. In contrast, for the preferred speciﬁcation, where the
adjustment probabilities are smoothly increasing and the distribution of ﬁrms
does not extend beyond eight quarters, inﬂation responds much more strongly
to the marginal cost shock; the magnitudes of the increase and subsequent
decrease in inﬂation are roughly three times as large as the corresponding
magnitudes for the Calvo case. Although the intermediate case gives results
closer to Calvo, still the impact effect of the marginal cost shock on inﬂation
is nearly 50 percent greater in the intermediate case than it is for pure Calvo
pricing.
Figure 1 can help us to understand the dramatic difference between inﬂa-
tion behavior under the Calvo and preferred speciﬁcations. Even though in both
cases roughly the same fraction of ﬁrms adjusts their price in a given period,
for the Calvo case a higher fraction of the adjusting ﬁrms are themselves recent
adjusters (in panel a, αj is relatively high for low j in the Calvo case). Since
recent adjusters have already responded to a recent shock, their effect on the
price level is small. By contrast, in the preferred case most of the adjusting ﬁrms
have last adjusted several periods ago. Thus, in periods immediately following
a shock, the model registers signiﬁcant additional adjustment to that shock. For
an adjusting ﬁrm, this means that it responds more strongly to a shock in the
preferred case; to not do so would mean that its relative price would move too
far from the desired level in ensuing periods.
That the impulse response functions differ sharply for the Calvo and our
preferred case has a direct bearing on whether Gal´ ı and Gertler’s empirical
results are sensitive to the assumption of Calvo pricing. Recall they found that
the dynamics of U.S. inﬂation could be closely replicated by a model of Calvo
pricing, where the main “forcing variable” for inﬂation was labor’s share, which
proxies for real marginal cost. The impulse response function of inﬂation to
marginal cost is one way of summarizing the model’s dynamics. Because the    
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Figure 2 Impulse Response Functions of Inﬂation to a
Marginal Cost Shock
Calvo model matches inﬂation dynamics, its impulse response function is the
“correct one” for matching the behavior of inﬂation. The preferred case gives
such a different impulse response function that it could not also match inﬂation
behavior when driven by the same marginal cost process; inﬂation would have
to be much more volatile than observed in the data, or real marginal cost would
have to be much smoother. We conclude, then, in support of Kiley’s (1998)
ﬁnding that the Calvo model is an extreme special case, not just a convenient
simpliﬁcation. Modifying the form of price stickiness so that (1) the probability
of price adjustment is a smoothly increasing function of time since last adjust-
ment, and (2) no ﬁrm keeps its price ﬁxed more than eight quarters leads to
dynamics fundamentally different than those of the Calvo model, even if one
holds constant the average length of time a price is held ﬁxed. With such a
change, it will no longer be possible to match inﬂation dynamics with labor’s
share proxying for real marginal cost.
4. SHOULD WE GIVE UP ON STICKY-PRICE MODELS?
One interpretation of our critique is that models with imperfect competition and
sticky prices are poor descriptions of the data and as such should be abandoned.  
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We prefer a constructive interpretation, which focuses on the assumptions that
guarantee labor’s share would be a good approximation to real marginal cost.
The ﬁrst interpretation assumes that labor’s share does represent real marginal
cost. In this case, if Calvo pricing is the only form of price stickiness consis-
tent with inﬂation dynamics, but is unacceptable for reasons discussed above,
then we should give up on this entire class of sticky-price models. On the
other hand, if labor’s share does not represent real marginal cost, then a more
plausible pricing speciﬁcation might be consistent with data on inﬂation and
marginal cost, correctly measured.
To justify using labor’s share as a stand-in for real marginal cost, we as-
sume that all ﬁrms produce using identical Cobb-Douglas technologies and that
there is an economywide competitive labor market. These assumptions clearly
represent an oversimpliﬁcation. Possibly by constructing a richer marginal cost
structure, one could reconcile a plausible sticky-price model with the behavior
of inﬂation. Sbordone (1998) has already analyzed a simple generalization for
marginal cost. She assumes the presence of a competitive labor market but
allows factor ratios and hence marginal cost to vary depending on when a
ﬁrm adjusted its price. Sbordone also maintains the assumption of Calvo-style
pricing, so it is unclear whether that particular generalization of the marginal
cost structure can generate realistic inﬂation dynamics when combined with a
realistic pricing speciﬁcation.
Once one is willing to relax the assumptions about factor markets and
technology, a wide range of behavior for marginal cost is possible; typically,
real marginal cost will not simply correspond to labor’s share. Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999a) work through several formulations: non-Cobb-Douglas
technology, overhead labor, overtime pay, labor adjustment costs, labor hoard-
ing, and variable capital utilization. Incorporating these features means that
to explain marginal cost one would need not only labor’s share but also such
variables as output, labor input, the marginal wage, current and expected future
growth of labor input, the fraction of labor input which is idle, and hours per
worker. Rotemberg and Woodford cite several papers that have pursued these
ideas in an attempt to learn about real marginal cost. Our interpretation of
Sbordone’s and Gal´ ı and Gertler’s work suggests that a next step would be
to study whether more reﬁned estimates of marginal cost can help reconcile a
plausible sticky-price speciﬁcation with the behavior of inﬂation.
Another worthwhile endeavor would be to use direct evidence on price
stickiness to choose α, and then use the relationship between marginal cost
˜ and inﬂation to estimate the behavior of marginal cost. In other words, instead
of using independent evidence on marginal cost to estimate the form of price
stickiness, one would be using independent evidence on pricing to estimate the
behavior of real marginal cost.   
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5. CONCLUSIONS
Current optimizing sticky-price models imply a tight relationship between real
marginal cost and inﬂation. We have worked through the steps in this relation-
ship in detail: expressions for the price index (5) and for a price-setting ﬁrm’s
optimal price (14) imply a linear system (19) that approximates the behavior
of the price level (and inﬂation) primarily as a function of real marginal cost.
In interesting recent empirical work, Sbordone (1998) and Gal´ ı and Gertler
(1999) use the relationship between marginal cost and inﬂation to estimate
sticky-price models and evaluate how well these models explain actual inﬂa-
tion. Their results are positive in that they ﬁnd sticky-price models are able to
explain U.S. inﬂation quite well. However, this empirical work relies on the
Calvo pricing speciﬁcation, where ﬁrms face a positive probability of having
their price ﬁxed for an arbitrarily long time. This pricing speciﬁcation is clearly
implausible. We have shown—building on work by Kiley (1998)—that if la-
bor’s share is used to proxy for real marginal cost, a more plausible pricing
speciﬁcation generates inﬂation dynamics inconsistent with the data.
Continued progress in empirical evaluation of sticky-price models will
require intensive study of the factors determining real marginal cost. With
more reﬁned estimates of real marginal cost, it may be possible to reconcile
a plausible sticky-price speciﬁcation with data on inﬂation. Conversely, to the
extent that we are conﬁdent a particular pricing speciﬁcation is correct, the
link between real marginal cost and inﬂation should allow us to come up with
independent estimates of real marginal cost. Such estimates will help us learn
about other aspects of the economy’s structure, such as the form of technol-
ogy, the competitiveness of factor markets, and the extent of adjustment costs
in hiring labor and installing capital. Ultimately, this knowledge will facilitate
constructing more accurate general equilibrium models, which can then be used
for the kind of policy analysis mentioned at the outset.         
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APPENDIX
Derivation of Demand Function and Price Index
To derive the demand function (2), solve the following problem: minimize the
cost of purchasing a given level of ﬁnal output y by choosing appropriate levels
of y(z), z ∈ (0,1) :
L =
















where P(z) denotes the nominal price of good z. The Lagrange multiplier on
the quantity constraint is the price level P, because the multiplier has the in-
terpretation of the marginal cost of an additional unit of ﬁnal output, and that
is precisely the price index. The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are
P(˜ z) = P










˜ z ∈ (0,1).







˜ z ∈ (0,1); (21)
demand for a ﬁrm’s product is increasing in the level of aggregate demand (y)
and decreasing in the relative price the ﬁrm charges.
Now we show how the price index is calculated as a function of the prices
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